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CASENOTES
in its opinion,26 and rejected its holding on somewhat dubious grounds.27
Faced by the need of overcoming the "equal but separate" rule,28 the
court declares, "Appellants by reason of their proportionate racial
needs and neighborhood pattern policies are not furnishing and have
prevented themselves from furnishing housing accommodations to persons
of low income 'upon the basis of equality of right.' ",29 The court further
reasons that if judicial enforcement of racial segregation schemes is
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, 0 it would be anomalous to
permit enforcement of such a scheme by the executive branch of a state
government. In effect, the court simply holds that it is unconstitutional
for the housing authority to consider the color or race of an applicant
in any manner.
In conclusion it appears that the issue of racial segregation in, or
discrimination in granting admission to, public housing projects presents
basically the same constitutional problems as other forms of racial
discrimination. Generally speaking, the Supreme Court seems to show
the greatest willingness to find a violation of the Constitution where
segregation or discrimination is in issue. The lower federal courts, while
theoretically bound by the Supreme Court holdings, appear to be more
readily influenced by local feeling than by stare decisis. 1 The state courts,
as may be expected, range from one extreme to the other in their
interpretation 32 of the Fourteenth- Amendment, and seem to have no
difficulty in finding authority to support practically any point of view.
Greater uniformity of decision in this field of law will probably await




Plaintiff sued for damages resulting from defendant cemetery's refusal
to bury her non-Caucasian husband. She had purchased a plot from
defendant which, by the terms of the contract, restricted burials to
members of the Caucasian race. Held, the restriction was not void as being
26. Ibid,
27. Ibid.
.I .the opinion . . . does not clearly indicate that the court's attention was
pointedly directed to the fact that the rights of 'persons,' not groups, were
involved under the 14th Amendment ....
28. Id. at 673.
29. Id. at 678. The court is quoting from the Missouri case, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
30. See note 18 supra.
31. Cf. Missouri ex Tel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Mendez v.
Westminster School District, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
32. Compare Patterson v. Board of Education, 11 N.J. Misc. 179, 164 At]. 892
(Sup. Ct. 1933), with the opinion of the Texas court in Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d
442 (Texas 1948), rev'd, 339 U.S. 629 (1949), Noted in 30 B.U.L. REv. 565 (1950).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
repugnant to the equal protection and privileges clause of the Federal
Constitution' as well as the state constitution. 2  Rice v. Sioux City
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 60 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1953).
For many years, constitutional attacks on racially restrictive covenants
were generally unsuccessful,' Prior to Shelley v. 'Kraeiner,4 which was
decided in 1948, the validity of private anti-racial covenants restricting the
sale of real property to, or occupancy of, persons of a certain race was
almost uniformly sustained over Constitutional objections.- While one
early case considered a racially restrictive covenant to be violative of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and refused to
enforce it," it was most generally considered that since the Fourteenth
Amendment applied only to state action, it had no application to privately
created restrictive covenants-even though they discriminated against
persons solely because of race or color." As authority for this view, the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Corrigan v. Buckley was
frequently cited. In that case, suit was brought in the District of
Columbia to enjoin threatened violation of certain restrictive covenants
relating to lands in the City of Washington. Relief was granted in the
district court, and in hearing the case on appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision on the grounds that since the covenants were on
lands situated in the District of Columbia, the case could present no
triable issues under the Fourteenth Amendment since that amendment,
by its terms, applied only to the states. That is was error for future
cases to use the holding in the Corrigan case' as precedent for enforcing
privately created restrictive covenants was brought out clearly in the
court's opinion in the Shelley case." In this decision, the court ruled
that state judicial enforcement of privately created restrictive covenants
1. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV:
. . . No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges . . . of citizens of the United States; . . . nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
2. IowA CONST. Art. I, §§ 1-25.
3. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Los Angeles Invest. Co. v. Gary,
181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919); Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822
(1930); Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 33, 34 S.E.2d 522 (1945);
Parmalee v. Morris, 281 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922); Ridgeway v. Cockbum,
163 Misc. 511, 296 N.Y. Supp. 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
4. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
5. Objections were generally based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, including the equal protection and due process clauses.
6. Gandolo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D.Cal. 1892).
7. Dury v. Neely, 69 N.Y.S.Zd 677 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
8. The history of judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants has been
thoroughly reviewed. See, Ming, Legal Disabilities Affecting Negroes, 8 JOURNAL OF
NECRO EDUCATION 406 (1938); McGovney, Racial Segregation by State Court
Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants, or Conditions in Deeds is
Unconstitutional, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 5 (1945); Miller, Race Restrictions on Ownership
or Occupancy of Land, 7 LAw. GULD REV. 99 (1947).
9. 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
10. Ibid.
11. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8 (1948).
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upon the ownership or occupancy of property was state action and
therefore repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Even before the Shelley case,"' judicial remedies appeared available
for the victims of racial segregation, notwithstanding the absence of state
statutes. But this was not the practical result. For example, if a Negro
presented himself for admission to a privately owned public establishment,
such as a theatre or hotel, and was denied admission solely because of
color, it was generally held by state courts that, in the absence of a
statute to the contrary, he was without remedy. -3  Even today, in those
states where there are "civil rights" statutes (Iowa has such a statute),'
recovery of damages for exclusion or segregation of a member of a
particular racial group is denied if the place involved is deemed not
within the coverage of the statute. '
The Iowa Supreme Court reasoned, however, that in the instant case,
it would require an extension of the rule in Shelley v. Kraemer to grant
plaintiff desired relief-an extension in the sense that the Shelley case only
bars direct action by the state, and has no application when a state is
silent or merely refuses to act. The court refused to "extend" the rule,
citing as authority the Civil Rights Cases."7  It held that "state action"
is only that action which is directly exerted by the legislative, executive
and judicial branches of government, and that the Fourteenth Amendment
erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory
or wrongful it may be.
Possibly the court erred in refusing to apply the Shelley v. Kraemer
rule to the facts in the instant case. Treating state silence or neutrality
as being indirect and therefore not "state action" gives rise to an illogical
conclusion. Is not the effect of inaction equally binding upon the litigants
as is this so called "state action"? Suppose one or more of the other
plot owners in the cemetery had brought a bill of injunctive relief against
threatened violation of the covenant 4 Clearly, Shelley v. Kraemer would
apply, and the right of the plaintiff would be preserved. Yet in an action
brought by herself, that right no longer exists.18
Charles S. Salem, Jr.
12. See note 4 supra.
13. Camp v. Recreation Board, 104 F. Supp. 10 (D. D.C. 1952); de la Ysla
v. Publix Theatres Corp., 82 Utah 598, 26 P.2d 818 (1933) (where a theatre manager
insisted that Filipinos must sit in the balcony and upon refusal of Filipinos to be so
seated, recover was limited to price of tickets not used).
14. IowA CODE c. 735 (1950), which names as places covered lodging houses,
restaurants, and amusement places. It is silent as to cemeteries.
15. Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Jinks
v. llodge, 11 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Rice v. Rinaldo, 59 Ohio Abs. 568,
95 N.E.2d 30 (1950).
16. See note 4 suPra.
17. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
18. Subsequent to this writing, cert. granted, 22 U.S.L. \VrxK 3254 (U.S. April
12, 1954).
